Houston criminal defense lawyer Jacquelyn Carpenter and a male friend were in the wrong place at the wrong time Monday evening.
She and the friend, who are both black, were on their way to go swimming after a trip to Walmart to buy swimsuits. Suddenly a swarm of police cars approached. She was ordered to put her hands in the air, to get out of the car, to follow one of the officers to his squad car. She knew without looking that a gun was pointed in her direction.
Police apparently believed Carpenter’s friend had just robbed a Cricket store and Carpenter was driving the getaway vehicle, and it was all because of a misidentification by a woman on the other side of a parking lot.
Just hours later, at about 4 a.m. Tuesday, Carpenter began to write about the experience on the Sustained!blog that is published by the name partner at her law firm, Davis & Associates. Carpenter, a 2003 magna cum laude graduate of Texas Southern University, had experienced firsthand the fear and confusion felt by many of the defendants she represents.
“My mind was whirling,” she told the ABA Journal. “There was so much stuff all at once, and I can’t believe this is happening.”
The story unfolds in Carpenter’s blog post. One of the officers who had stopped her, a Harris County constable, began to ask questions. Where was she coming from? At the time, Carpenter didn’t know why she had been pulled over, but she realized it was far from a routine traffic stop.
Carpenter, writing in the third person, explains what happened next. “She knew the answer; it was simple. She had no real reason not to tell him, but innocent people go to prison all the time because they cooperate thinking they are innocent and the judicial system will work. No, she refused to be part of that group. Besides, she knew better. She had to take her own advice on this one. She told the officer, ‘I don’t want to answer your questions.’
“The officer seemed surprised, but came back quickly, ‘Why not? If you don’t have anything to hide, you can tell me where you were.’ The officer was insinuating she had something to hide, but she did not. She was a criminal defense attorney. Should she tell him? Would it make a difference? Probably not. She responded to his inquiry, ‘I want my lawyer.” Another surprised look, a narrowing of the eyes, so she answered his unasked question, ‘Arrest me. If that is what you are going to do, then arrest me. But understand, I still want my lawyer.’ The officer put the handcuffs on her.”
Sitting handcuffed in the squad car, Carpenter could hear bits and pieces of the officers’ questioning of her friend, who didn’t display the same reticence about talking. He told about the Walmart trip and revealed that Carpenter is a criminal defense lawyer.
It turned out that Carpenter’s car was stopped at a light outside a Cricket store after it had been robbed, and a woman outside the store had told police that Carpenter’s friend looked like the suspect, even though he was a parking lot away. Another man at the scene wasn’t so sure. He accompanied police to take another look, and as Carpenter waited in handcuffs in the police car, he looked at Carpenter’s friend and told police, “That’s not him.”
But Carpenter’s ordeal still wasn’t over. A police officer continued to ask questions, Carpenter says, although she didn’t answer. Police took Carpenter and her friend back to the Cricket store, and had her car towed car there. She and her friend weren’t released until police reviewed the surveillance video.
“This experience was humiliating, insulting, demeaning, hurtful, scary—everything our clients tell us it is,” she wrote.
“It was so easy for this lady to randomly select a black male from the general public and have him and me scrutinized and interrogated, which is a scary thought in and of itself.”
Carpenter told the ABA Journal she also posted her story on Facebook, and since then she’s heard from a lot of black men who told her she now knows what it feels like to be one of them. She also spoke to a Hispanic lawyer who said he was wrongly detained on two different occasions, once with a police helicopter circling overhead.
She thinks her rights were violated, since she was detained even after the witness said her friend wasn’t involved and questioned even after she asked for a lawyer. But she doesn’t plan to sue.
“It wouldn’t be worth anything,” she said. “And I think that’s part of the sadness involved. You can violate somebody’s constitutional rights and at the end of the day you can get off scot-free because there are no damages in it.”
Georgia: Witnesses in Murder Case Recant
By RUSS BYNUM (AP) – 4 days ago
SAVANNAH, Ga. — A federal judge heard new testimony Wednesday in the case of a Georgia death row inmate given a rare chance by the U.S. Supreme Court to prove his innocence nearly 20 years after a jury convicted him of killing a police officer.
Attorneys for Troy Anthony Davis say witnesses who identified him as the killer of Savannah police officer Mark MacPhail during Davis’ 1991 trial were pressured by police into making false statements. New witnesses have since come forward to say another man confessed to the slaying after Davis was convicted.
In U.S. District Court on Wednesday, Davis’ lawyers rested their case after calling nine witnesses to support that claim. The hearing will continue Thursday with prosecutors presenting rebuttal evidence.
Judge William T. Moore said he’s highly skeptical of testimony that another man has admitted to shooting MacPhail, because Davis’ attorneys did not subpoena the man they say is the real killer.
“This hearsay testimony is looked at with suspicion and great caution,” said Moore, who told attorneys he may give the claims “no credence whatsoever when I make my ruling in this case.”
Davis, 41, won a rare chance to argue he was wrongly convicted of killing MacPhail, an off-duty police officer who was shot as he rushed to help a homeless man being attacked near a downtown bus station.
Davis sat in the courtroom Wednesday wearing his white prison uniform and chains on his ankles, while dozens of his supporters from groups including Amnesty International and the NAACP rallied outside the courthouse.
Federal death penalty appeals usually look only at questions of due process and constitutional rights. But the nation’s high court last summer took the unusual step of granting Davis a chance to prove his innocence.
Legal experts say the Supreme Court set a tough standard for Davis. The court’s August decision said his attorneys must “clearly establish” Davis’ innocence.
Two witnesses, Anthony Hargrove and Benjamin Gordon, testified that Sylvester Coles — who was with Davis when the slaying occurred in August 1989 — later confessed to each of them that he shot MacPhail.
Hargrove said he and Coles were smoking marijuana together years ago when Coles told him, “You know, I shot a cop over there. …Troy took the fall.”
Gordon, who is related to Coles by marriage, testified Coles made a similar confession to him. Gordon also said he witnessed MacPhail’s shooting and was certain it was Coles who fired the gun.
Although Gordon was a witness at Davis’ 1991 trial and later signed affidavits for Davis’ defense team in 2003 and 2008, Wednesday was the first time he said he was an eyewitness to Coles pulling the trigger.
“What made you change your story today?” Beth Burton, an assistant Georgia attorney general, asked Gordon. “You didn’t think that was important to say earlier?”
Gordon said he had been afraid Coles might harm his family, but decided to speak up because “I’ve had this burden on me for a very long time.”
The judge pressed Davis’ attorneys on why they didn’t call Coles as a witness so he could respond to the accusations.
Davis’ lawyer, Stephen Marsh, replied: “There’s no reason to believe Mr. Coles is going to come in here and say, ‘Yes, I did.’”
Coles refused to discuss the case with The Associated Press when contacted during a 2007 court appearance. He has no listed address or phone number.
Also Wednesday, two witnesses said they lied when they told jurors in 1991 that Davis had confessed to killing MacPhail.
Kevin McQueen said he concocted the story to get back at Davis because they had a feud in jail while Davis was awaiting trial.
“I made up a lie saying that he told me he shot a police officer,” McQueen said. “He never confessed to shooting anybody.”
Jeffrey Sapp, one of Davis’ former neighbors, also testified in the 1991 trial that Davis described shooting MacPhail. On the witness stand Wednesday, Sapp said police pressured him into making that statement.
“I was so scared that I told them anything that they wanted to hear,” Sapp said. “They kept saying, ‘Just say Troy told you.’”
Burton noted that jurors heard Sapp back off parts of his story in 1991. According to the trial transcript, Sapp stuck to his claim that Davis confessed but said many details he’d told police “I just made up.”
Davis has been scheduled for execution but spared three times, though each of his previous appeals have been ultimately rejected.
May 12, 2010
New York Minorities More Likely to be Frisked
By AL BAKER
Blacks and Latinos were nine times as likely as whites to be stopped by the police in New York City in 2009, but, once stopped, were no more likely to be arrested.
The more than 575,000 stops of people in the city, a record number of what are known in police parlance as “stop and frisks,” yielded 762 guns.
Of the reasons listed by the police for conducting the stops, one of those least commonly cited was the claim that the person fit the description of a suspect. The most common reason listed by the police was a category known as “furtive movements.”
Under Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, the New York Police Department’s use of such street stops has more than quintupled, fueling not only an intense debate about the effectiveness and propriety of the tactic, but also litigation intended to force the department to reveal more information about the encounters.
The Center for Constitutional Rights, which got the data on stop and frisks after it first sued the city over the issue after the 1999 killing of Amadou Diallo, said its analysis of the 2009 data showed again what it argued was the racially driven use of the tactic against minorities and its relatively modest achievements in fighting crime.
The center, a nonprofit civil and human rights organization financed by donors and foundations, and other critics of the tactic like to note that a gun buyback program conducted by the police at several Bronx churches one day in January yielded 1,186 guns.
Police officials, for their part, vigorously praise the stop-and-frisk policy as a cornerstone of their efforts to suppress crime. The stops led to 34,000 arrests and the seizing of more than 6,000 weapons other than guns, according to the center’s analysis.
The police officials argue that the widespread use of the tactic has forced criminals to keep their guns at home and allowed the department to bank thousands of names in a database for detectives to mine in fighting future crimes.
Besides better reporting, the surge in the number of stops, they said, is also a byproduct of flooding high-crime areas with more officers, a strategy for a force with a shrinking headcount.
“These are not unconstitutional,” Paul J. Browne, the Police Department’s chief spokesman, said of the stops. “We are saving lives, and we are preventing crime.”
According to the analysis of the 2009 raw data by the Center for Constitutional Rights, nearly 490,000 blacks and Latinos were stopped by the police on the streets last year, compared with 53,000 whites.
But once stopped, the arrest rates were virtually the same. Whites were arrested in slightly more than 6 percent of the stops, blacks in slightly fewer than 6 percent. About 1.7 percent of whites who were stopped were found to have a weapon, while 1.1 percent of blacks were found with one.
Given that, some experts who have studied stop-and-frisk data over the last several years say that what prompts an officer’s suspicion for a stop, and the discretion used, are important.
In examining the stated reasons for the stops, as checked off by police officers on department forms, the center found that about 15 percent of the stops last year cited “fits a relevant description.” Officers can check off more than one reason, but in nearly half the stops, the category called “furtive movements” was cited. Nearly 30 percent of stops cited a category called “casing a victim or location”; nearly 19 percent cited a catchall category of “other.”
“These stats suggest that racial disparities in who gets stopped has more to do with officer bias and discretion than with crime rates, which is what the Police Department argues,” said Darius Charney, a lawyer with the Center for Constitutional Rights.
Mr. Browne, the department spokesman, said stop-and-frisk data was “examined in great detail,” in 2007 by the RAND Corporation, “which found no racial profiling.” He said the stops mirrored crime — that while a large percentage of the stops involved blacks, an even larger percentage of violent crimes involved suspects described as black by their victims.
The work by the Center for Constitutional Rights is the latest in a series of examinations of the police tactic defined by a Supreme Court decision from decades ago, Terry v. Ohio, which permitted officers to detain someone briefly based on “reasonable suspicion,” a threshold lower than the probable cause necessary for a formal arrest.
The issue exploded in New York after Mr. Diallo’s killing, when those who protested the shooting contended there was a pattern of racial profiling in stop and frisks. A study in 1999 by Eliot Spitzer, then the state’s attorney general, found that blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately stopped in relation to their involvement in crime and their share of the city’s population.
In 2001, the city enacted a law requiring the police to provide quarterly reports about the raw data to the City Council and settled a lawsuit, also brought by the constitutional rights group, requiring that plaintiffs be given more valuable raw data.
Reporting by the police has recently become more regular. On April 30, Mr. Browne said that in 2010 there were 149,299 stops through March 31, about 13 percent fewer than in the first quarter of 2009. So far, he said, the stops yielded 186 guns.
As the numbers come out, analysts and academics pore over them to gauge effectiveness.
In March, researchers from the Center on Race, Crime and Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice said that more data and “increased public discussion of this controversial policing practice” were essential.
“If the public does not have access to the data, in a format that allows the experts to identify important trends, then it harms the public discourse,” said Donna Lieberman, the executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, which successfully sued to get the raw data. “And that is precisely the situation that we are in.”
Particularly vexing to Jeffrey A. Fagan, a professor of law at Columbia University who studied the issue for Mr. Spitzer, is that few can say what happens once the “11 or 12 percent” of street stops that lead to an arrest or summons get to court.
“Are these cases that stand up?” he said. “Do they result in convictions?”
Professor Fagan said it was impossible to tell what dent in crime the tactic had made. Christopher T. Dunn of the civil liberties group said there was no proof it had. Crime has gone down steadily since 1991, but, he said, “stop and frisk exploded in 2004.”
But Heather Mac Donald, a research fellow at the Manhattan Institute who has spoken to police officials about the tactic, said there was no question it had an effect on crime. She said that great disparities existed in who committed crime in New York and that the police fought crime where it was highest, in mostly minority neighborhoods.
“Where are they supposed to go?” she asked.
Ms. Mac Donald echoed Mr. Browne, who said the police were confident the tactic was stopping crime before it occurred.
Mr. Browne took issue with the constitutional rights group’s conclusions about the numbers of arrests or gun seizures the street stops yield, saying, “762 guns can do a lot of damage.” He said taking guns from people in the street was different from accepting their surrender from “moms and grandmothers.”
And he laid out the logic of the stops: More police are sent to higher crime areas, where criminals and victims live; more suspicious activity is associated with that crime, so there are more opportunities for officers to observe suspicious behavior as a result.
John A. Eterno, a former city police captain who worked to computerize the department’s stop-and-frisk data before he retired in 2004, said the tactic could be effective in pushing down crime. But Dr. Eterno, now an associate dean of criminal justice at Molloy College, said retired commanders had spoken of the pressures to reflect their use of stop and frisk in CompStat, the department’s computerized crime-tracking system.
“My take is that this has become more like a ‘throw a wide net and see what you can find’ kind of thing,” he said. “I don’t see it as targeted enforcement, especially when you see numbers that we are talking about.”
The Center for Constitutional Rights also studied poststop outcomes.
It found that officers frisked more people in 2009 than a year earlier but that the rate of frisks for blacks and Latinos was much higher than it was for whites. It found that the police used force in 24 percent of stops — drawing a weapon, say, or throwing people to the ground. The police used force in 19 percent of the stops involving whites but in 27 percent of stops against Latinos and in 25 percent of those involving blacks.
Mr. Charney of the Center for Constitutional Rights said the disparities in the use of force, compared with the numbers of arrests and summonses and of weapons and contraband seized, was something that “the police have not really explained to the public.”
TN: No special REP (reasonable expectation of privacy) in hallway of condo from knock-and-talk
Defendant had no special expectation of privacy in the common areas of his condominium that were secured by security codes. The police came to the building to do a knock-and-talk and got access by entering after another tenant came out. His girlfriend admitted them, and drugs and drug paraphernalia were in plain view. State v. Talley, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (March 19, 2010), aff’g State v. Talley, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 506 (July 1, 2009): Having considered our 2001 holding in Ross and the developments in the federal courts of appeal since the Sixth Circuit decision in Carriger, we reject any bright-line rule and maintain our view that the totality of the circumstances test is best-suited for determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. Application of these factors to the circumstances existing at Hedrick Place favors the State. Although the Defendant had a 1/21st ownership interest in the common areas of the building and the front entrance was locked at all times, each of the residents, according to Reasor, had the right to permit entry without restrictions. Neither the Defendant nor any other resident could unilaterally exclude others rightfully within the hallway. While the Defendant was entitled to privacy in his condominium unit, there is no evidence that he exhibited a subjective expectation that the common areas, and particularly the hallways, would be free from intermittent access by the police. To the contrary, the record establishes that the condominium residents had collectively provided not only the police department but also several others with the entry code for use in the ordinary course of their duties. Police access was “discretionary” and not always limited to emergencies. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Defendant had taken any precautions to maintain his privacy in the common areas of the building. The totality of these circumstances establish that the Defendant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior hallway between the condominium entrance and the door to his particular unit.
Posted by Baker Associates
Can I Represent Myself?
The United States Constitution guarantees a plethora of rights to the accused in criminal trials including rights that have previously been discussed in this blog including the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. One right that has not been previously been discussed on this site, however, is the right not to have an attorney. That is, do criminal defendants have the right to represent themselves, also known as proceeding pro se, or can the court force them to have an attorney at trial?
The United States Supreme Court took encountered this issue head-on in Faretta v. California in 1975. In Faretta, the defendant was charged with grand theft and a public defender was appointed to represent Faretta at his arraignment. Prior to trial, Faretta (believing that he could provide himself with the best representation because the public defender had a heavy case load) requested that the public defender be removed from the case and that Faretta be allowed to represent himself. The trial judge warned Faretta that he believed him to be “making a mistake” and informed him that he would receive no special favors at trial, but the judge accepted Farretta’s waiver of counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se. A few weeks later, the judge held a hearing at which he sought to test Faretta’s knowledge of courtroom procedure and the rules of evidence. After the hearing, the judge was not convinced that Faretta was familiar enough with courtroom rules and procedure to represent himself at trial and reversed his earlier ruling, appointing an attorney for Faretta. After Faretta was convicted at trial, he appealed, arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial.
The United States Supreme Court agreed with Faretta. They held that the Sixth Amendment, which applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right of self-representation and that he or she may proceed pro se when he or she voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. The Court held that in this case the state courts erred in forcing Faretta against his will to accept a public defender and in denying his request to conduct his own defense.
This case thus established the principle that criminal defendants may represent themselves in criminal trials if they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so. However, persons accused of crimes should be aware of the enormous risk that accompanies this decision. Attorneys are formally trained to handle trials and ethically bound to represent criminal defendants to the best of their ability. An experienced Nashville criminal defense attorney will be able to handle even the most complex of situations that may arise at trial, whereas the defendant will have no previous experience with some situations that may occur. Thus, although criminal defendants do have a constitutional right to represent themselves, it is not always wise to do so. Future blog articles will discuss the ramifications of this decision in more detail.
Posted by Baker Associates
The officers entering eight seconds after announcing defendant’s home entered illegally because there was no denial or constructive denial of entry. The knock-and-announce rule serves important interests, and the search is suppressed. [Hudson was not cited. Here, one officer had a tape recorder on his person, and eight seconds was just not enough.] State v. Gonzales, 2010 NMCA 23, 2009 N.M. App. LEXIS 281 (December 21, 2009), Released for Publication February 23, 2010: [*21] We are unwilling to accept the State’s generic assertion that drugs could be destroyed as justifying the officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce rule. See State v. Ortega, 117 N.M. 160, 162-63, 870 P.2d 122, 124-25 (1994) (holding that “the mere potential for destruction of evidence does not in itself give rise to any exigency,” but that if the officer has good reason, based on “particular circumstances,” that suspects will destroy evidence, that evidence will excuse compliance with the knock and announce rule). [*22] The knock and announce rule serves a number of purposes, including preventing the needless destruction of property and protecting “the sanctity of the home and individual privacy.” Attaway, 117 N.M. at 147, 870 P.2d at 109. Both of these purposes were frustrated in this case without justification. The police did not knock, did not wait, and did not provide Defendant with any realistic opportunity to allow them to enter. In the absence of a showing of exigency, we conclude that the law enforcement officers violated the knock and announce rule, such that all evidence stemming therefrom was properly suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm. [Having briefed knock-and-announce for SCOTUS three times, I am a firm believer in the importance of the privacy rights in the home the knock-and-announce rule protects. Some state courts will reject Hudson on state grounds in the right case, and a bad enough fact situation could still prevail in a federal court. Hudson was not a bad fact situation for the state.]
Posted by Baker Associates
Scope of Automobile Searches: Containers
There is a vehicle exception to the requirement that law enforcement officials must obtain a search warrant in order to search a person’s property for evidence of a crime. Simply put, law enforcement officials may search a vehicle without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity will be found inside the vehicle and where exigent circumstances exist that necessitate searching the vehicle immediately. With respect to automobiles, the requisite circumstances basically exist where the automobile can be driven out of the jurisdiction and thus poses the threat of loss or destruction of evidence. Although this exception has been in place for quite a while, it has not always been clear exactly how intrusive the search was allowed to be with respect to items found inside the vehicle. That is, can law enforcement officials only seize what is in “plain view” in the vehicle, or may they conduct a more extensive search that extends to opening containers, bags, etc. that are found inside the vehicle?
In California v. Acevedo, the United States Supreme Court provided some clarity on this issue. In summary, the Court held that where police officers have probable cause to search a vehicle under the vehicle exception the officers are allowed to search containers such as bags, cans, pouches, and so forth to the same extent that they would be allowed to search them had they actually gone before a magistrate and obtained a search warrant. This holding basically means that if the police have probable cause to search a part of a vehicle, they are also allowed to search inside containers found in that part of the vehicle that may contain evidence of criminal activity. It should be noted, however, that this ruling does not extend outside the subject of containers found inside vehicles. That is, the ruling does not take away the requirement that law enforcement officials have probable cause in order to search all or part of a vehicle.
Posted by Baker Associates
Man Kills Burglar with Samurai Sword
A would-be burglar got more than he bargained for last September when he broke into a home shared by several Johns Hopkins University Students. Apparently the students had heard him come into the house and four of them confronted him in the garage, one of whom was somehow armed with a samurai sword. The students, who had contacted authorities, were attempting to hold the burglar in the garage until police arrived when the burglar reportedly lunged at the student who was holding the sword. In a seeming self-defense effort, the student swung the sword at the burglar, severing the burglar’s left hand completely and cutting the man’s upper body. The burglar died from his injuries. Controversy surrounded the case concerning whether or not the student should face criminal charges. As of this writing, he has not been formally charged in connection with the incident.
One important point to be taken from this situation is that it is not wise to break into the homes of ninjas. On a more serious note, this case illustrates how fine the line can be between murder and self-defense. In Tennessee, a person has the right to use a reasonable amount of force against another to prevent the suffering of death or bodily harm. Thus, the factors that would be considered in charging the individual in Tennessee would be whether the burglar could reasonably have been thought to have presented a risk of serious bodily injury or death to the students and whether the use of the sword in self-defense was a reasonable use of force. Considering that the burglar was reportedly lunging at the student holding the sword in what may have been an attempt to obtain control of the weapon, the student may have been justified in using that sword to defend himself from that risk. Whether or not this situation weighs more toward self-defense or homicide charges will ultimately rest with the discretion of the prosecutor.
Source: http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/15/samurai.sword.killing/index.html
Posted by Baker Associates
The way that Tennessee’s simple possession statute is written provides that it is an offense for a person to possess a controlled substance “[u]nless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice.” Thus, Tennessee law creates a “valid prescription” defense to a simple possession charge. To establish such a defense, a defendant basically has to prove to a jury’s satisfaction that he or she had a valid prescription to possess the controlled substance at the time the offense was committed.
In a case that recently came before the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant tried to prove that he possessed a valid prescription for a controlled substance by arguing that the prescription belonged to his friend and that his friend had a prescription for the substance which created a situation that would establish a “valid prescription” defense. However, the defendant offered no evidence that his friend had a valid prescription for the substance other than the friend’s testimony. No pharmaceutical or medical testimony or records were offered at all. The jury was thus free to find, and did so find, that the “valid prescription” defense was not established and that the defendant was guilty of simple possession.
When, as here, a defense against a criminal charge exists, proof of the defense must be established in a persuasive enough manner to convince the jury or judge trying the case that the claim of defense is actually true. With regard to a valid prescription defense, medical or pharmaceutical records showing proof of the prescription are by far the most persuasive evidence that can be offered, and should have been offered in the above case if such records existed. Defendants who find themselves in similar situations would be wise to contact an experienced drug crime defense attorney who can assist them in the presentation of their defense.
Source: (State v. Kilpatrick, 35 TAM 11-25, 1/21/10, Nashville, Witt, 6 pages.)
Posted by Baker Associates
Appealing A Guilty Plea
For various reasons, a guilty plea is not an agreement to be entered into lightly and the considerations that the defendant must take into account extend beyond merely what punishment or lack thereof is being offered by the state. For example, entering a guilty plea may also impose additional burdens on a defendant (depending on the terms of the agreement) including the loss of the right to appeal the case.
This principle is illustrated by taking a look at State v. Weaver, a case that recently came before the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In Weaver, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine in Tennessee with intent to sell and was given a four-year suspended sentence. Soon thereafter, he tried to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that at the time he pleaded guilty, he was not aware that he was forfeiting his right to appeal a question of law relating to his charges. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the defendant’s situation did not meet the standard of “manifest injustice” required to withdraw the plea.
What this holding basically means is that the Court found that the defendant was fully aware of the consequences of his guilty plea and entered into the plea knowingly. At trial, the court had informed the defendant that if he pleaded guilty that his case would be fully completed, meaning the defendant could not later appeal, request a jury trial, or continue the case in any manner. This condition is often a part of a guilty plea because at least part of the incentive for the state to offer the plea is to bring the case to a conclusion. After being informed of these consequences at trial, the defendant indicated that he did understand them. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals would not allow him to reopen the case at a later date by withdrawing his plea and attempting to file an appeal.
Accepting a guilty plea is a huge decision with severe and lasting consequences. Defendants would be wise to obtain the assistance of experienced criminal defense counsel before making a decision of such importance.
Source: (State v. Weaver, 35 TAM 11-26, 1/14/10, Nashville, Witt, 3 pages.)
